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Is the Clean Development Mechanism delivering benefits to the poorest communities in 
the developing world? 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the international market based systems in operation to tackle climate change and help 
the worst-off reach sustainable development is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether it respects principles of social and participatory 
justice. The first section describes the state of the climate as well as who is most vulnerable to 
its human impacts, and briefly discusses the resources dedicated to helping the worst-off 
adapt to climate change. Using criteria of social and participatory justice, the second section 
of this paper analyses whether the CDM is succeeding in its objective to assist the developing 
countries in pursuing sustainable development. Based on the findings of this analysis, the 
third section offers policy recommendations with a view to making the CDM more beneficial 
to the worst-off. The concluding section provides a summary of our main arguments and 
findings.  
 
1. Climate change and the worst-off 
 
Relative to 1990 levels, global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have risen by 30-39%, with 
a 20% rise in the period 2000-2010 (Le Quéré et al. 2009; UNEP 2012: 10). Although 
emissions from the developed countries have largely stabilized, emissions from emerging 
economies have doubled, mostly due to the growing international trade between industrialized 
and developing countries (Peters et al. 2009, 2012; IEA 2013: 27). Since it is estimated that 
emissions from the rising economies and the rest of non-OECD countries will top those of the 
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developed countries in the third decade of this century, it is clear that these countries will 
have to participate in future mitigation efforts as well (van Vuuren et al. 2009).  
 
Although the prevention of a 2°C global mean temperature rise (GMT) relative to pre-
industrial temperature has been adopted by the UNFCCC and the EU’s climate policy (EC 
2007; UN 1998), research shows that global GHG emissions remain on track to meet the 
IPCC’s most fossil fuel intensive GHG emission scenario, which would constitute a 4°C 
temperature rise by 2100 (Betts et al. 2011: 80-2; Le Quéré et al. 2009; Peters et al. 2013: 5).  
 
While global leaders have delayed negotiations on a new binding emissions treaty to 2015, 
which would come into effect no sooner than 2020 (UNFCCC 2011), research indicates that 
global emissions would have to peak and decline before the end of this decade in order to 
have a reasonable chance of limiting global warming to 2°C GMT (Arnell et al. 2013: 2; den 
Elzen, et al. 2013: 496; Rogelj et al. 2012: 7; Rogelj et al. 2011: 414; Meinshausen et al. 
2009: 1160). Rogelj and colleagues observe that, despite all the uncertainty regarding the 
geophysical, social and technological aspects of the climate problem, the dominant factor 
affecting the likelihood and costs of achieving the 2°C objective is related to politics (2013a: 
80). 
 
Yet, whereas the politics that have to be agreed upon assume collective action, humanity is 
utterly divided in terms of wealth, health, living standards, education, and well-being 
(Biermann 2012: 6). Of particular relevance in this regard is the inequity inherent to climate 
change: although the poorest of the world are only responsible for a small part of the 
emissions that contribute to climate change, they (will) suffer most of the consequences 
(Costello et al. 2009: 1694; GHF 2009: 62). It is estimated that in the first half of the previous 
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decade 98% of those affected in weather related disasters such as floods, droughts, and heat 
waves were members of developing countries (GHF 2009: 61). Furthermore, 60% of the 
global population is vulnerable to climate change in socio-economic terms, and approximately 
500 million people live in countries that are extremely vulnerable due to their geographical 
location and social circumstances (GHF 2009: 58, 60). Moreover, in the second half of the 
previous decade 235 million people were estimated to be seriously affected by climate change 
every year and 315,000 deaths were due to climate change (GHF 2009: 11). Projections for 
2030 indicate that the number of affected persons will rise by 103% (GHF 2009: 14).   
 
The worst affected regions include the Sahara, the coastline of Eastern Africa, all of South 
Asia, and many small island states. Africa is the most vulnerable region, being home to 15 of 
the world’s 20 most vulnerable countries. Those who directly rely on natural resources for 
their livelihoods such as farmers, fishermen, and low-wage earners will suffer income loss 
(GHF 2009: 58). It is estimated that by 2020 rain-fed agricultural yields in Africa could be 
reduced by 50% (IPCC 2007: 50). Furthermore, half of the world’s population lives in urban 
areas (IEA 2013: 88) and this amount is expected to rise to 70% by 2050 (Hoornweg et al. 
2010: 16). In developing countries the share of urban populations is larger than in 
industrialized countries and the former will most likely bear 75% of the burdens of damages 
produced by climate change (Hoornweg et al. 2010: 4, 15).  
 
Furthermore, climate change is already exacerbating chronic environmental threats and 
ecosystem losses are constraining livelihood opportunities, especially for the poor. Unless 
action is taken urgently, in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, future progress 
in human development will be threatened, effectively halting or even reversing decades of 
human development progress (UNDP 2013: 95). Even more alarming is the estimate that, in 
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case of unabated environmental deterioration, 1  the number of people living in extreme 
poverty would be 3.1 billion by 2050 (UNDP 2013: 95). In addition, 83% of displacements 
(119.8 million people) between 2008 and 2012 were triggered by climate- and weather-related 
hazards such as floods, storms and wildfires (IDMC 2013: 36; see also IPCC 2012, chapter 2). 
In 2012 alone, relative to 2011, the amount of displacements almost doubled to 32.4 million 
people, 98% of which involved climate- and weather-related displacements (IDMC 2013: 11).  
 
2.  The Clean Development Mechanism 
 
2.1 Background 
 
One of the international economic systems in operation to tackle climate change is the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) defined by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) (UN 
1998). The detailed rules for its implementation and governance were adopted as part of the 
Marrakesh Agreements (UNFCCC 2001). The purposes of the CDM are: (1) to assist non-
Annex I Parties in achieving sustainable development; and (2) to assist Annex I Parties in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments 
(UN 1998: 11).  
 
The CDM is a market-based offsetting mechanism, which creates certified emission 
reductions (CERs). When countries (under the KP) or companies (under the EU Emission 
Trading System or ETS) invest in emissions saving projects in developing countries, the 
equivalent of the saved emissions results in CERs that project investors can trade or use to 
comply with mitigation pledges (European Parliament and the Council of the EU 2003). 
                                                        
1
 Environmental deterioration is defined as the effects of global warming on agricultural production, access to clean water 
and improved sanitation, and pollution (UNDP 2013: 95). 
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Article 12 of the KP provides that the proceeds from certified project activities are to be used 
to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing countries to meet the costs of 
adaptation (UN 1998). The KP further states that the trading of emission reduction units shall 
be supplementary to domestic action for the purpose of meeting emission reduction 
commitments (UN 1998: 7, 15).  
 
It is estimated that in 2011 the voluntary carbon market, to which the CDM is the chief 
contributor, delivered but 3.09% of global climate funding (Buchner et al. 2011: 4). In 2010 
the World Bank estimated that $75 – 100 billion or €57 – 77 billion would be required by 
2050 to support adaptation to the inevitable impacts of climate change on developing 
countries. However, the resources that have been committed to address mitigation and 
adaptation in these developing countries cover less than 5% of what will be needed annually 
by 2030 (Hoornweg et al. 2010: 5; Huhtale et al. 2010: 1).  
 
Furthermore, although the rhetoric used in global climate change negotiations indicated that 
climate finance should be split 50:50 between adaptation and mitigation, in 2011 the scale 
stood at 5:95 (Buchner et al. 2011: 7). Since mitigation activities tend to have more private 
sector participation, the amount of private finance is triple that of public finance, with 
bilateral financial contributions exceeding multilateral ones (Buchner et al. 2011: 4-6).  
 
The future of the CDM looks grim. The KP’s first compliance period ended in 2012 and 
although a temporary successor was installed, entitled the Kyoto Protocol Second 
Commitment Period (KPII), the effort is futile in light of the 2015 negotiations. Because it 
omits the US and Canada and demands no binding reduction pledges from the emerging 
economies such as China, Brazil and India, the KPII now merely accounts for 15% of global 
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emissions (Grubb 2013: 282).  Furthermore, demand for CERs will only be powered by the 
EU ETS and the Australian emissions trading system (Grubb 2013: 281). Hence, CER prices 
keep track of the currently low EU ETS entitlement prices. 
 
The EU ETS has been discussed from the perspective of two criteria of justice, effectiveness 
and fairness of the distribution of burdens (Dirix et al. 2013). The effectiveness of the EU 
ETS is threatened by the initial overallocation of emission entitlements, the banking of 
entitlements, and the use of offsetting credits, which have led to low carbon prices. The CDM 
is also prone to a number of additional problems, which include: the questionability of the 
claimed additionality of projects; the CDM’s ‘climatic equivalence’ of surplus emissions of 
investors; the wrong incentive CDM offers to host countries; and the future vulnerability of 
the poorest countries and megacities when politically binding mitigation agreements are 
broadened so as to include non-OECD and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). In view of 
these flaws, offsetting in general can severely postpone emissions reductions and is thus 
ineffective.  
 
2.2 How just is the CDM? 
 
 2.2.1 The assessment of project contributions 
 
In this section the CDM will be evaluated from the perspective of participatory and social 
justice. This evaluation will be informed by available research on the governance as well as 
the effectiveness of the CDM, with a particular focus on research that uses the Project Design 
Documents (PDDs – i.e. the CDM application forms) as a primary source of information.  
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Since no ex post verification is made of the ex ante sustainability claims made by the project 
developer, project contributions are merely assessed on the basis of project documentation 
(Crowe 2013: 63; du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 10; UNFCCC 2012a: 7). Moreover, it 
remains very difficult to assess project contributions to sustainable development (SD), since 
the Marrakesh Agreements stipulate that, in the absence of an internationally accepted 
definition of SD, it is the host country’s prerogative to define the criteria of SD (UNFCCC 
2001; 2012a: 10).  
 
In practice this implies that a governmental Designated National Authority (DNA) evaluates 
PDDs against a set of pre-defined criteria, encompassing environmental and social aspects of 
sustainability (Boyd et al. 2009: 822; Olsen 2007: 62; Schneider and Grashof 2007: 4).  
However, in addition to intense competition between developing countries to attract CDM 
projects and the fact that there are little or no price premiums to be gained from investing in 
projects with higher contributions to SD, the absence of international standards regarding SD 
results in a trade-off favouring the most cost-efficient emissions reduction projects, with the 
envisaged development opportunities taking a back seat to the emissions reduction aspect (du 
Monceau and Brohé 2011: 4; Gillenwater and Seeres 2011: 30; Lloyd and Subbarao 2009: 
240; Olsen 2007: 67; Sutter and Parreño 2007: 76, 89). This trade-off could lead to a race-to-
the-bottom in terms of SD standards, with non-Annex I countries undercutting each other to 
attract CDM investment, thereby fundamentally weakening the SD objective (Sutter and 
Parreño 2007: 76). Leaving the task of defining SD to the host country has arguably resulted 
in the concept usually being interpreted as ‘economic growth’ (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 
1610). Moreover, available research indicates that CDM projects tend to deliver real emission 
reductions but do not contribute towards the host country’s SD and the benefits accruing from 
CDM projects do not extend to poor people or local communities (Lloyd and Subbarao 2009: 
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240; Sutter and Parreño 2007: 89). Some commentators therefore argue that the envisaged 
development opportunities appear to be more hypothetical than real (Lloyd and Subbarao 
2009: 240). We will evaluate these observations in the light of principles of social and 
participatory justice.  
 
2.2.2 The CDM and social justice 
 
As mentioned earlier, the KP identified two goals for the CDM, the first of which is to assist 
non-Annex I countries in achieving SD. Since this goal especially focuses on the situation of 
those who (will) suffer most from climate change, it can be interpreted as caring for the 
worst-off. Although this remains a minimal and vaguely formulated distributive principle, we 
consider it to be a highly valuable guiding principle for climate policy instruments. Human 
development should include sustainable development since human development is inevitably 
flawed if it does not ensure that future generations can live fulfilling, healthy and educated 
lives (Peeters et al. 2013). Indeed, human development without sustainable development 
cannot be true human development (Neumayer 2010: 1; 2013: 562; Griggs et al. 2013: 306). 
Furthermore, although the CDM has no defined mission of delivering pro-poor benefits and 
has only been marginally successful in delivering them, there seems to be a consensus in the 
literature that the social dimension of SD should include poverty alleviation and equity as 
general criteria (Olsen 2007: 62).  
 
It is widely acknowledged that the CDM has the potential to apply SD benefits at a 
community level and to direct these benefits to the poor (Crowe 2013: 75). Hence, in our 
view, the CDM has the formidable task of contributing to the alleviation of poverty through, 
inter alia, improving rural access to affordable ‘clean’ energy and investments to decrease 
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vulnerability to climate change events and to increase climate resilience (Djanibekov et al. 
2012; Mattsson et al. 2009; Tyler & Moench 2012).  
 
Since clean energy is necessary to reduce poverty, malnutrition and hunger, to improve health 
and literacy, and to enable especially women and children in the developing world to live 
better lives, it is considered to be a prerequisite of human development, and thus of 
sustainable development (Newell et al. 2011: 10; Sihori 2007: 102; Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 
1601-2). Access to clean and reliable energy can help improve standards of living and support 
sustainable livelihoods among rural and low-income urban populations, hence small-scale 
rural renewable energy projects seem to offer the best prospects for poverty alleviation under 
the CDM (Brunt and Knechtel 2005: 8). However, in 2010, 17% of the global population did 
not have electricity access, with 85% of those without access living in rural areas and 87% in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia (World bank/IEA 2013: 91). In addition, the IEA 
(2013: 97) reports that the resilience of the energy system should be considered more 
explicitly since energy supply and transformation will be exposed to greater physical risks, 
which will drive up costs and impair energy supply liability in addition to accelerating the 
devaluation and deterioration of assets.  
 
In 2012 the UN launched the ‘Sustainable Energy for All’ programme which aims to ensure 
universal access to modern energy services, double the global rate of improvement in energy 
efficiency, and double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030 (UN 
2012b). Rogelj and colleagues have examined these goals and found that the UN’s initiative 
could provide multiple sustainability benefits such as eradicating poverty, improving energy 
security and public health, thereby instigating the process of climate protection (Rogelj et al. 
2013b: 551). 
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On the basis of evaluations of the PDDs submitted in the context of the CDM, the UNFCCC 
has concluded that the most prominent benefits claimed by project developers are the 
stimulation of the local economy through employment creation and poverty alleviation, 
followed by pollution reduction and the promotion of renewable energy and energy access. 
However, in all countries, social benefits tend to be cited less often than economic and 
environmental benefits. Furthermore, stimulation of the local economy, which includes job 
creation and poverty alleviation, was only explicitly present in 31% of the 2,864 examined 
projects in 2011 (UNFCCC 2012a: 19).  
 
Sihori (2007: 105) has examined 65 PDDs for CDM projects in India and found that, although 
India is one of the most attractive non-Annex I countries for project development, social 
development is not at the heart of these projects as described by the applicants. She found that 
the potential of CDM projects to bring about observable reductions in rural poverty through 
the supplementation of agriculture income is doubtful on several grounds. The projects, Sihori 
argues, are limited in scope and have not been designed to directly benefit the agricultural 
sector. Neither do they offer benefits to landless households, which account for 48% of the 27 
to 30% rural poor living in India today. Landless labourers can only expect an income rise if 
labour productivity is increased. However, without technical progress in agriculture, Sihori 
argues, labour productivity is unlikely to rise significantly (Sihori 2007: 98). As regards 
technology transfer, Das has examined 1000 PDDs and found that the contribution of the 
CDM to technology transfer can at best be described as minimal. Furthermore, given that the 
core objective of project participants is to generate CERs in the most cost-effective manner, 
decisions regarding the choice of technology and its source are bound to be subservient to this 
core objective (Das 2011: 28).  
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Although the CDM has undoubtedly delivered improvements in energy efficiency in 
industrial firms and has thereby decreased production costs, rural poverty can only be affected 
by these improvements if the decrease in production costs can be transmitted to the products 
in the consumption basket of the rural poor (Sihori 2007: 104). Rural areas in particular need 
renewable energy since the distribution of fossil fuel energy is expensive and challenging. 
The limited physical access of rural households to electricity, as well as their low purchasing 
power, prevent the rural poor from having access to energy. The CDM is therefore deemed to 
play a critical role in making renewable energy and energy efficiency sustainable and 
replicable in developing and least developing countries (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 1602).  
 
Yet, even the impact of increased power generation from renewable energy sources may not 
be very effective in improving the access of the rural poor to ‘cleaner’ energy. In addition, so 
far, only the better-off households in urban and rural areas are reaping the benefits of the 
power supply increase to the electricity grid resulting from renewable energy related CDM 
projects (Sihori 2007: 102). Sihori concludes that the socio-economic development potential 
of CDM projects in India is doubtful. Since the benefits of projects focussing on energy 
efficiency in industry remain largely ‘firm-specific’, these projects are unlikely to have an 
impact on rural poverty (Sihori 2007: 105). The CDM has thus far failed to direct energy 
investment to the poorest countries (Newell et al. 2011: 27) or communities. 
 
Subbarao and Lloyd have examined 500 registered small-scale CDM projects in the fields of 
employment, migration, access to electricity, health, the use of local resources, local 
environment, and stakeholder perception. They found that CDM projects have generated: a 
highly beneficial impact on the utilisation of local resources; a medium to high score for 
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socio-economic and human development impacts; a low to medium beneficial impact on 
employment generation for the local community and region; a low to medium score on 
stakeholder perception; low beneficial impacts on the local environment and community; a 
non-existent or very low level of beneficial impact on migration, community education, health 
and associated services, and electricity access; and a non-existent or very low beneficial 
impact on marginalised people in the community (Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 1605-6).  
 
In line with these findings, on the basis of an analysis of 16 CDM projects, Sutter and Parreño 
have found that 23% of all CERs were generated by projects owned by transnational private 
companies, with revenues flowing to people outside of the host country. A mere 0.3% of 
CERs created revenues were likely to flow to the poorer 50% of the host country population 
(Sutter and Parreño 2007: 84). As it seems unlikely that the benefits generated from these 
projects will ‘trickle down’ to reach the poor, these projects are unlikely to create any 
significant impact on the alleviation of rural poverty (Lloyd and Subbarao 2009: 242).  
 
In a recent study, Crowe (2013) has examined 114 CDM projects for pro-poor benefits and 
found that 74% of CDM projects delivered no pro-poor benefits at the local community level, 
indicating that the project was not located in a high poverty area or that the documentation did 
not explicitly specify that the claimed benefits would be directed to the poor. Furthermore, 
16% of the examined projects delivered only weak pro-poor benefits and a mere 10% of the 
projects were rated as ‘moderate’ or ‘strong’ (Crowe 2013: 66). 
 
Some commentators argue that the CDM has served to mirror or even reinforce inequities in 
flows of finance, both between and within countries. Despite efforts by, for example, the 
Chinese government to steer investors toward the poorest parts of the countries, the wealthier 
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regions in all three major CDM host countries (Brazil, India and China) are more likely to 
attract CDM projects (Newell 2009: 432). In short, the conclusion thus far seems to be that 
the CDM has not yet produced substantial benefits regarding poverty alleviation and that it 
has provided only limited support of sustainable social and economic development in host 
countries (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007: 3). Hence it fails to meet the requirements of 
social justice.  
 
2.2.3 The CDM and participatory justice 
 
After reviewing research on the impact of the CDM on the social justice dimension of 
sustainable development, this section will assess whether and to what extent the CDM 
complies with requirements of participatory justice. This assessment will be based on the 
application of three criteria, which up to a certain extent are related: inclusion; impartiality; 
and equality of opportunity (Page 2011: 53-4). Without attempting to be exhaustive, this 
assessment is informed by relevant literature on the PDDs of the CDM projects.  
 
2.2.3.1 Inclusion 
 
According to the principle of inclusion, the interests of all relevantly affected parties should 
be considered when identifying environmental objectives and the means to achieve them 
(Page 2011: 53). When applying this principle to CDM projects, we should note that although 
the CMD Executive Board (EB) has recently prepared propositions which will be deliberated 
upon at the 19th Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC, serving as the 9th meeting of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) in November 2013 in Poland, the CMP will conduct 
the first review of the modalities and procedures for the CDM (UNFCCC 2013). Prior to these 
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propositions, no guidelines on procedures for carrying out stakeholder consultations were 
available (du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 3). Moreover, project developers may be biased in 
selecting participants for stakeholder consultation and critical views may thus be 
underrepresented in project reports (Boyd et al. 2009: 826). As already mentioned, Subbarrao 
and Lloyd (2011: 1606) have found that, although small-scale CDM projects have ensured 
participation at the local level, the impact level of local stakeholders has not been very 
significant. In addition, the number of projects that have actually adapted their activities 
following a stakeholder consultation appears to be extremely limited (du Monceau and Brohé 
2011: 10). Stakeholder consultation regarding CDM projects is often only “rudimentary, 
completely unregulated and badly documented” (Sterk et al. 2009: 18).  
 
Globally, CDM projects are geographically unevenly spread. A mere 1.4% of projects can be 
found in Sub-Saharan Africa, while the bulk of projects are located in emerging economies 
such as China, India and Brazil  (Boyd et al. 2009: 821; Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Das 
2011: 8; Lloyd and Subarrao 2009: 240; UNFCCC 2012a: 8). In addition, although climate 
vulnerability is significant in many of the global South’s urban environments, less than 1% of 
the current CDM projects are located in cities (Hoornweg et al. 2010: 36).  
 
Furthermore, the CDM market appears to favour large, high CER volume projects since small 
community-based projects are often not economically viable due to the high transaction costs 
and complex bureaucratic procedures (Lloyd and Subarrao 2009: 240). Indeed, both NGOs 
and academic researchers have observed that the nature of the approval process excludes civil 
society: since the PDDs are very technical, they remain virtually inaccessible to local 
communities (Naughten 2010: 17-8; Newell 2009: 428). Moreover, the extent to which local 
communities can comment on the CDM projects is highly dependent on structures of local 
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governance and opportunities for participation (Boyd et al. 2007: 25). Furthermore, non-
technical considerations and concerns of local communities are rarely addressed or even 
reflected upon by project developers (Naughten 2010: 17-8). Hence, the supposed 
beneficiaries rarely have access to the information or expertise required to participate in this 
highly complex process, nor can they question or challenge the process.  
 
As already mentioned, access to sustainable and affordable energy is key to enable poverty 
alleviation. However, as argued by Newell and colleagues (2011), the sensitive nature of 
issues concerning energy supply and access in regional and bilateral agreements, together 
with the geopolitical and strategic importance of energy, gives rise to a situation in which 
most countries exercise their right to sovereignty so as to maintain autonomy and control over 
energy pathways, and few global institutions exercise direct authority over energy resources. 
Therefore, when regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements are negotiated, which 
include provisions on energy access and security, the broader public is excluded (Newell et al. 
2011: 52-3). Thus, the first criterion of participatory justice, inclusion, does not appear to be 
met by the CDM in its current form. 
 
2.2.3..2 Impartiality 
 
The impartiality criterion implies that policies should be implemented according to pre-
established formalities, rules, and procedures. Officials should neither exploit their positions, 
nor arbitrarily favour particular agents. Furthermore, rules enforced by regulators should be 
sufficiently consistent and transparent (Page 2011: 54). Flues and colleagues (2008: 2) have 
found that, although UNFCCC rules on the CDM explicitly state that the CDM Executive 
Board (EB) meetings should be public (UNFCCC 2006: 38), positions on individual projects 
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are exchanged behind closed doors. Although the EB can decide to exclude the public in 
exceptional cases when deliberating on individual CDM projects, the exceptions have become 
the rule.  
 
In contrast to the high level of transparency for decisions about methodologies,2 the only 
information available on individual projects is the actual decision (Flues et al. 2008: 6; 
Nyaoro and Chatterjee 2011: 14). Moreover, while EB members must declare in writing that 
they have no financial interests in CDM projects, there have been allegations of conflicts of 
interests (Newell et al. 2011: 41). According to some commentators, EB decisions are highly 
politicized and subject to intense lobbying, as they tend to favour projects relevant for EB 
member countries (Flues et al. 2008: 16; Newell 2009: 427). Hence, the criterion of 
impartiality does not seem to be met.  
 
2.2.3..3 Equality of Opportunity 
 
Thirdly, in order to comply with participatory justice, a policy should also reflect norms of 
‘background fairness’. Referring to examples given by Barry (2002: 98-9), Page says the 
following about background fairness: “the initial condition of those bound by social policies 
should be roughly equal in terms of their ability to understand the procedures involved; the 
experience of the costs of compliance; and the ability to oppose to, or at least express 
dissatisfaction with the rules, and suggest policy changes” (Page 2011: 54). The equality of 
opportunity criterion thus implies that all relevant parties should have an equal opportunity to 
partake in the scheme and reap the benefits thereof.  
                                                        
2
 Methodologies provide information that is required in order to determine the amount of CERs generated by a mitigation 
project activity. By using generic modules, methodological tools are referenced in large-scale and small-scale methodologies 
in order to determine specific conditions (e.g. additionality of a CDM project activity) or to calculate particular emissions 
(UNFCCC 2012b: 39-40). 
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It has been argued that CDM mainly offers end-of-pipe technology solutions and reaps the so-
called low hanging fruits (Erion 2005; Gillenwater and Seres 2011: 31; Hepburn 2007: 385; 
Sihori 2007: 105; Sterk et al. 2009). This is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it is 
unlikely that end-of-pipe solutions hold a large potential to positively contribute to the local 
environment, to deliver substantial economic or social benefits (Sterk et al. 2009: 55) or to 
enhance the climate resilience of the world’s poorest communities. Second, if and when 
mitigation efforts will be widened so as to include non-OECD countries, the future 
generations of these countries will have to undertake more expensive emission reduction 
programs themselves, since high-emitting countries will have no economic incentive to buy 
emission credits from them. Hence, in the future, low-emitting countries will find themselves 
trying to buy back, at a much higher price, the surplus emissions entitlements which they sold 
cheaply only ‘yesterday’ to Annex B countries under the KP or to corporations under the EU 
ETS  (Agarwal, 2002: 384). 
 
In sum, since the CDM in its current form does not meet the criteria of inclusion, impartiality 
and equality of opportunity, it fails to comply with the requirements of participatory justice. 
 
3.  Policy recommendations for an underachieving CDM 
 
3.1 Policy 
 
According to the KP and EU ETS rules, offsetting should be “supplemental to domestic 
actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments” (UN, 1998: 15; European Parliament and the Council of the EU 2003: 33). In 
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the EU ETS, the EU has limited the use of flexibility mechanism credits to no more than 50% 
of the emission reductions to be made between 2008 and 2020 (EC 2009: 24). In addition, the 
EU decided to prohibit the use of CERs from certain industrial gases as of 2013 and intends to 
move from CDM towards sectoral crediting, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. 
Furthermore, the EU plans to focus on CDM activity in least-developed countries (Erickson 
and Lazarus 2011: 2). The EU has declared that the environmental integrity of the CDM 
should be improved and that a pure offsetting mechanism cannot deliver the emission 
reductions needed to keep global warming below 2°C.3  
 
The CDM has also put in place more detailed methods and requirements, with new layers of 
audit and review added, together with increased human resources dedicated to the process. 
These improvements began to have effect from 2007 onwards. Prior to the revision, the 
proportion of projects rejected or selected for more rigorous investigation by the CDM 
Executive Board (EB) was around 10 %, while by 2009 it had increased to 61 % (Gillenwater 
and Seeres 2011: 19; McKinsey & Company 2009: 3). Furthermore, in line with the decisions 
under the Kyoto Protocol, the EB has reviewed modalities and procedures for the CDM and 
has made a number of propositions in light of the review (UNFCCC 2013). 
 
Although various analysts claim that the CDM has the potential to deliver SD and pro-poor 
benefits, it should be clear from the studies discussed in the previous sections of this paper 
that the CDM violates the requirements of social and participatory justice. Therefore, 
following Caney (2010: 218), we would submit that emissions trading can be morally 
satisfactory only if it either rejects the CDM altogether or if the CDM is radically reformed.  
 
                                                        
3
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/linking/faq_en.htm  
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During the years the KP was in place, high-polluting countries relied heavily on the 
mechanism to comply with reduction targets (OECD/IEA, 2005: 64). It is thus plausible that, 
when a new emissions abatement treaty is put into effect in 2020, the use of offsetting 
mechanisms will be high on the agenda again. Furthermore, despite facing difficult challenges 
to the EU ETS, the voluntary demand for carbon offsets in 2012 grew by 4%, but the market 
value decreased by 11%, with the European private sector as the largest demand driver 
(Peters-Stanley & Yin 2013: 5, 8). There is little doubt that the CDM is in urgent need of 
reforms if it is to realize its goal of assisting the developing countries to move towards a more 
sustainable development paradigm. In the following section, without attempting to be 
exhaustive, we summarize some recommendations that would, in our view, help enable the 
CDM, or a future version of it, to fulfil that goal.  
 
3.2 Proposed measures  
 
3.2.1 Social Justice 
 
In Crowe’s analysis of 114 CDM projects, twenty-five of these projects had a premium add-
on standard such as the Gold Standard4 or the Social Carbon methodology and the Climate, 
Community & Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) (Crowe 2013). These add-on standards concern 
a stringent and transparent set of criteria with which project developers need to comply, 
thereby shaping and constituting the ‘rules of the game’ by which participants abide, for the 
standards provide incentives and disincentives to behave in particular ways (Newell 2009: 
                                                        
4
 The Gold Standard (GS), for example, was established in 2003 by a consortium of NGOs and only allows renewable energy 
and end-use energy efficiency projects. To obtain the GS, project developers need to answer eleven question concerning 
human development issues. These questions cover human rights, resettlement, removal of cultural heritage, freedom of 
association, compulsory labour, child labour, discrimination, healthy work environment, precautionary approach in regard to 
environmental challenges, degradation of critical natural habitats, corruption (Sterk et al. 2009: 7). In addition, project 
developers submit a sustainability monitoring plan which is used to verify ex post whether the project has indeed contributed 
to SD as assessed ex ante (Sterk et al. 2009: 16). See also http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/ 
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430). Research indicates that projects certified with the Gold Standard generally capture 
greater SD benefits than is the case for CDM projects without add-on standards (Killick 2012: 
21). Crowe’s results show that 64% of the projects with add-on standards delivered pro-poor 
benefits, while 36% did not, leading to the conclusion that projects with premium add-on 
standards may, overall, perform better than regular CDM projects (Crowe 2013: 69).  
 
Although Crowe (2013: 69) and Sihori (2007: 101-2) have found that the development of 
renewable energy projects does not prima facie outperform other project categories in 
delivering pro-poor benefits, their results lend support to the conclusion that community-
based, small scale, renewable energy projects hold more potential for the delivery of pro-poor 
benefits than large scale projects (Brunt and Knechtel 2005; Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 1601-
2). However, although rural energy provision projects are particularly positive in contributing 
to human development and thus sustainable development, they are rare in the CDM pipeline 
(Boyd et al. 2009: 822; Subbarao and Lloyd 2011: 1602). Since CDM projects are seldom 
found amongst the poorest, a regionally balanced growth of CDM projects needs to be 
incentivized. Hence, in the absence of private CDM projects in regions with a high poverty 
incidence, public sector entities should set up CDM projects in these areas, especially those 
pertaining to renewable energy and the agricultural sector (Newell et al. 2009: 9; Sihori 2007: 
106). Alternatively, premium prices or add-on standard validation should be granted to CERs 
from CDM renewable energy projects located in regions with a high poverty incidence. 
 
Since CERs with add-on standards outperform conventional CERs in delivering pro-poor 
benefits, a tax could be raised on the trade of the latter, with revenues funding local 
development projects. Such a tax would be analogous to a Tobin tax (Ott and Sachs 2000: 
19). The Chinese government, for example, raises taxes on HFC CDM projects with revenues 
 
21
flowing to a ‘CDM Fund’, which is supposed to finance renewable energy projects (Bozmoski 
et al. 2008: 27; Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 338; Newell 2009: 427). A tax on conventional CERs 
could possibly outbalance the surplus cost of CERs with add-on standards, which are 
generally sold at about 25% above the market value for normal CERs (Bulkeley and Newell 
2010: 97).  
 
In addition, propositions have been made to apply a discount rate to CERs (du Monceau and 
Brohé 2011: 17; Castro and Michaelowa 2010; Schneider 2008; Sterk et al. 2009: 22, 31). 
Although this proposition intends to ensure that the CDM delivers de facto emission 
reductions, it can also be applied to discriminate against conventional CERs in favour of 
CERs with add-on standards. The latter would then be exempted from the discount rate. When 
discounting CDM emission reductions, not all reductions generated by a project enter the 
carbon market, meaning that part of the emission reduction is not used to offset emissions 
elsewhere, but to provide real global emission reductions (Castro and Michaelowa 2011: 5). 
Discounting CDM emission reductions without add-on standards could potentially redirect the 
mechanism towards the poorer developing countries, as discount rates can be tied to the level 
of development of the host country. Discounting emission reductions would then be in line 
with the CDM objective of assisting developing countries in progressing towards SD (Castro 
and Michaelowa 2010: 6-7). This could create an increased demand for CERs with add-on 
standards, which would result in a premium price for CERs from projects with a strong 
contribution to SD, which in turn might increase the share of these projects in the carbon 
market (Sutter and Parreño 2007: 89). 
 
Furthermore, CDM projects that focus on building climate resilience in poor regions, be they 
rural or urban, could be awarded with add-on standards. While adaptation focuses on singular 
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risk factors, resilience addresses the overall performance of a region and the reliability and 
efficiency of an asset’s or location’s performance under a wide range of circumstances 
(Brugmann 2012: 217). Regarding energy, governments need to implement policy 
frameworks that help overcome the barriers across different sectors of the economy, in order 
to help vulnerable regions address risks by developing an integrated approach to conventional 
development planning, project design and development regulation (IEA 2013: 97; Brugmann 
2012: 231). 
 
The most fundamental CDM reform needed, however, is the development of more specific 
SD criteria. Currently, few procedures exist to ensure that projects produce social and 
environmental SD benefits (Gillenwater and Seres 2011: 30). Moreover, a clear and globally 
accepted definition of SD is unlikely to be accepted since developing countries consider such 
a definition to be an infringement of their sovereignty (Olsen 2007: 61). Nevertheless, we 
would argue that existing and prominent definitions of SD – such as those by the Rio 
Declaration (UNCED 1992, Principle 3) and the Brundtland Commission (WCED 1987, 54) – 
can function as guidelines to the development of SD criteria for CDM projects.5  Unless 
national leaders agree on minimum standards for SD indicators, the CDM mechanism will 
remain flawed. A possible remediation, which has been suggested by several commentators, 
would be to adopt a ‘do no harm’ approach that would include agreed quantitative SD 
indicators. Any improvement upon the baseline could be left to the host country’s decision, 
thereby respecting its national sovereignty (du Monceau and Brohé 2011: 16-7; Killick 2012: 
22; Sterk et al. 2009: 222). 
 
                                                        
5
 Despite persisting discussions about the definition of SD, there is a body of global agreements related to SD that have been 
reached at the UN level (see NGO Committee on Education, n.d.). 
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Furthermore, in the absence of a national, regional or global agreement on what SD should 
include, entities such as the EU could introduce their own additional requirements for 
importing CERs into the EU ETS (Sterk et al. 2009: 23) or, alternatively, they could further 
limit the quantity of CERs a party can use (Caney 2010: 218). National CDM Authorities 
should require project developers to present a clearer exposition of social sustainability and 
development input of their projects (Sihori 2007: 106). In addition, the criteria that host 
countries employ to evaluate whether a project may generate CERs should be tightened. For 
example, CERs could only be granted to projects using non-fossil fuels (Caney 2010: 218). 
Projects that would then be able to demonstrate the desired SD input of their projects could be 
rewarded in the form of add-on standard validation of their projects (Sihori 2007: 106).  
 
Regarding the add-on standards, since the Gold Standard (GS) focuses primarily on 
renewable energy and end-use energy efficiency projects (Sterk et al. 2009: 14), Crowe 
suggests the development of a new and revised premium add-on standard which would 
incorporate a number of key characteristics, so as to offer a pathway to more CDM projects 
actualizing their potential to both deliver individual pro-poor benefits and to contribute to 
poverty alleviation. Such characteristics would include a focus on projects at the community 
and household level, located in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and areas of high 
poverty (Crowe 2013: 76). Although the GS demands comprehensive stakeholder 
participation (Sterk et al. 2009: 20), this focus should be complemented with a combination of 
specific pro-poor criteria (Crowe 2013: 76). According to Crowe’s (2013: 76) survey results, 
a strong demand exists on the carbon market for CERs with pro-poor benefits attached. Hence 
there is a good market potential for an explicitly labelled pro-poor CDM add-on standard.  
 
3.2.2 Participatory Justice  
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Since, as explained earlier, the CDM fails to meet the requirements of participatory justice, 
adjustments to its governance and project cycle process are necessary. However, few of the 
problems we have listed can be addressed through ad hoc remedies. No matter how carefully 
the CDM governance were to be redesigned, it would remain unable to overcome or 
compensate for governance deficits at the national and subnational level in terms of 
accountability, transparency, and legitimacy (Newell 2009: 432). In addition, the lack of 
capacity within the EB is in many ways matched by a lack of capacity at the national level 
among authorities responsible for registering and monitoring CDM projects (Boyd et al. 2007: 
27; Newell et al. 2009: 12). Nevertheless, one possible ad hoc solution would be to introduce 
mechanisms that commit ex post validation of the PDD’s claims before a project is granted 
approval (Nyaoro and Chatterjee 2011: 25).  
 
Another short-term fix would be for the CDM Executive Board to (re)consider the quality 
thresholds applied by a Designated Operational Entity (DOE, i.e. entities that evaluate 
whether a project is eligible for the CDM) when deciding on registration and issuance 
(Nyaoro and Chatterjee 2011: 23). In the propositions made by the CDM Executive Board to 
the 9th meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol the EB has indeed recommended that the rules 
on accreditation should include principles that the Board must apply to elaborate and enforce 
the standards for DOEs. These principles should include consistency, impartiality, 
transparency and confidentiality, rigour, competence, and openness and accessibility 
(UNFCCC 2013: 7). Furthermore, regarding stakeholder consultation, the EB has proposed to 
mandate the DOEs to validate whether local stakeholder consultation was carried out in 
accordance with host country laws and regulation, “and to evaluate how the content of the 
comments was duly taken into account” (UNFCCC 2013: 8). Although these propositions are 
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a step forward, they are still rather vague and offer little guidance on implementation. 
Moreover, the latter proposition leaves the extent and depth of the stakeholder consultation to 
the host countries’ initiative.   
 
Since public participation in the CDM’s decision making is currently limited, one of the most 
promising long-term adjustments would be to increase cooperation between private and 
public sectors, in other words, to involve business, NGOs, and civil and academic society in 
the CDM decision-making process. However, adjustments would need to take into account 
the diverse local or regional political situations. In India, for example, NGOs and civil society 
do not function as a watchdog of the CDM but rather as a partner, directly participating in and 
promoting CDM activities. In Brazil, having established procedures for public consultation, 
several universities offer courses in CDM project development, whereas in China public 
participation in decision-making is limited and NGOs abstain from critically commenting on 
CDM projects (Fuhr and Lederer 2009: 336; Newell 2009: 433).  
 
A new add-on standard, as advocated by Crowe (2013), could require projects to take 
stakeholder consultation seriously by verifying ex post the ex ante claims made in the PDDs 
concerning possible local concerns/participation/benefits. Although such verification would 
be difficult to operationalize, an additional set of modalities and procedures could outline 
detailed requirements for stakeholder involvement, including who to involve, how to 
communicate and contact stakeholders, how often and in whose presence consultations need 
to take place, and how to present the project in a non-technical manner and appropriate local 
language (Sterk et al. 2009: 23). In light of these requirements a ‘global checklist’ could be 
created which would need to be respected by project developers. Nevertheless, local 
stakeholder involvement may face problems such as, inter alia, a lack of discussion culture in 
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the host country or local residents perceiving the presence of local officials as intimidating 
(Sterk et al. 2009: 15). Such potential obstacles are not addressed by the EB’s proposition. 
 
Although NGOs are hardly able to ensure quality assurance, as they lack the capacity to look 
into specific projects, collaboration between NGOs, civil and academic society and business 
could address this lacuna. NGOs and civil society could be called upon to help verify whether 
the global checklist criteria are met which would enable project developers to better recognise 
community needs (Newell et al. 2009: 14; Streck 2004: 312). Furthermore, NGOs could 
mobilize stakeholder participation and help prioritize CDM mitigation options, capacity 
building activities, and policy measures (Streck 2004: 312). Investors would benefit, for the 
financial risk would be reduced since the projects would enjoy local support and would thus 
avoid political opposition, legal action and local unrest (Streck 2004: 311-2; Newell et al. 
2009: 15). Furthermore, business could be awarded with add-on standard CERs not prone to 
discounting. Serving as a best practice example, intense collaboration between the academic 
world, NGOs and policy makers already characterises the ‘climate change scene’ in Brazil 
(Newell et al. 2009: 12).  
 
Last but not least, a ‘grievance mechanism’ should be built-in during the implementation 
phase. If valid grievances are not addressed appropriately or if the quality of the CERs cannot 
be assured, the project should no longer receive CERs or should lose its add-on standard 
qualification (Sterk et al. 2009: 29). When groups of countries start demanding the application 
of additional sets of modalities and procedures for importing CERs into their emissions 
trading systems, CERs with add-on standards delivering pro poor benefits and intensive 
stakeholder consultation will become increasingly appealing.   
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4. Conclusion 
 
While the UN and EU have adopted the maximum 2°C rise principle in their climate policies, 
research indicates that a 4°C rise is more likely. Furthermore, although climate change hits 
the poorest hardest, the flows of adaptation finance do not meet the current needs. The CDM 
is an offsetting market-based mechanism that delivers CERs to those investing in emission 
abatement in developing countries. Although the EU ETS is the only large emission trading 
system in which CERs are traded, the system has become terminally flawed as a result of 
design issues and oversupply of entitlements and CERs. We have conducted an extensive 
review of the relevant literature and found that the CDM is not fulfilling its second core 
objective, i.e. assisting developing countries to reach sustainable development. Starting from 
the assumption that sustainable development should include human development, we have 
analysed whether the CDM delivers pro-poor benefits to host country communities in 
accordance with principles of social and participatory justice. We found that the CDM falls 
short in both respects, prompting the conclusion that the mechanism should either be 
strengthened or abolished. Finally, we have discussed a variety of policy recommendations 
that would enable the CDM, or a future version of it, to fulfil its formidable task of helping 
the worst-off. Even if climate policy tools achieve emissions reductions, a failure to support 
those most victimized by a problem they are not responsible for, renders any policy unjust and 
morally reprehensible and thus in need of fundamental rethinking.   
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